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U
ntil the Asian financial crisis occurred in mid-1997, the high-perform-
ing Asian economies were dubbed as the new crown jewels of
governance. With public institutions believed to be functioning
remarkably well, good governance was seen as partly responsible for
the region’s phenomenal economic strides. A half decade of turbulence, however,
beginning with the financial meltdown, followed by a severe recession in 1998, and
continuing with the sharp slowdown today, has made this view quite untenable.
The governance gains turned out to be a little overblown.
The crisis left the public sector with new governance pressures. With
increased debt levels and ballooning budget shortfalls, and the real possibility
that social spending would be sacrificed in favor of interest payments, Southeast
Asian governments have been forced to practice greater efficiency in the use of
public resources. Soaring contingent liabilities, the result of moral hazard (implicit
guarantees) in the financial system and the infrastructure sector, have raised
demands for greater transparency and accountability in government transactions,
and a clamor for more reasonable regulatory practices. Civil society initiatives in
combating corruption have brought about changes, especially in political leader-
ship, in a number of Southeast Asian countries (World Bank 2000).
In short, the economic downturn uncovered dormant afflictions (for example,
corruption), intensified others (such as poor resource management) and provoked
new ones (such as political instability). Overall, such pressures have raised the
stakes for better public management throughout the region. Thus, in order to
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attain economic resilience as well as prevent external shocks from transforming
into major crises, Southeast Asia will need major changes in public governance
and institutions.
DEFINING GOVERNANCE
Following the definition set by the United Nations Development Programme (1998)
and Huther and Shah (1998), governance refers to the exercise of economic,
political and administrative power in the management of the resource endowment
of a state. Its practice requires mechanisms, processes and institutions through
which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise legal rights, meet their
obligations and mediate their differences.
Good governance, among others, is:
) Transparent. Free flow of information is guaranteed; processes and
institutions are directly accessible to those concerned with them.
) Accountable. Decisionmakers in government, the private sector and
civil society organizations are accountable to the public, as well as to
institutional stakeholders.
) Based on the rule of law. Legal frameworks are fair and enforced impar-
tially.
) Efficient and effective. Processes and institutions produce outcomes
that meet needs while making the best use of resources.
) Participatory. Differing interests are mediated and broad consensus is
reached on political, social and economic priorities (UNDP 1998).
Governance includes the state, the private sector and civil society, all of
which are critical to sustainable growth and human development. The state cre-
ates a favorable political and legal environment. The private sector generates jobs
and income. Civil society expedites political and social interactions.
Governance also refers to the ability of the state to provide institutions,
defined broadly as the “rules of the game.” Rules create incentives that shape the
actions of public officials. They vary because of differences in social and eco-
nomic structures (World Bank 2000).
Institutions are key to governance in the following ways: They can (a) chan-
nel information about public goods and in the process help government regulate
well; (b) reduce the likelihood of disputes and help enforce contracts or agree-
ments through the judicial system; (c) provide clear and transparent mechanisms
governing businesses, thus reducing corruption and bureaucratic obstacles; (d)
facilitate competition through a good regulatory structure; and (e) ensure, through
a system of rewards and penalties, that resulting incentives lead to the desired
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This paper examines governance mechanisms and institutions in the
context of the following:
) Internal rules and restraints—constraints on executive and legisla-
tive power, independence of the judiciary, civil service and budgeting
rules and regulatory mechanisms.
) Competition—private participation in infrastructure, yardstick compe-
tition and privatization of certain market-driven activities; and
)        “Voice” and partnership—decentralization to empower local govern-
ments and spur civil society participation.
SOUTHEAST ASIA IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT
Southeast Asia is a heterogeneous regional setting comprising a number of coun-
tries with differing sizes, levels of development and governance systems. The
Southeast Asia 5—Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines—
are generally more endowed with managerial capacity and systems, and farther
along the route to liberalization. By contrast, the transition economies of Vietnam,
Laos and Cambodia, plus Myanmar, still have much to learn in terms of public
management and are also behind in the path toward open and competitive societies.
As a group, these countries are an increasingly important force in the world
economy. Their collective weight in global economic activity has been rising.
Southeast Asia is fast growing, next to East Asia: the average annual growth rate
of its gross national product as a bloc is nearly six percent; that of its gross
national product (GNP) per capita is nearly 4 percent (Figure 1), which is about
three times the record of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) countries between 1990 and 1998.
Figure 1. Southeast Asia’s annual growth
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Many of these nations have embraced trade liberalization as a means to
progress. Some—like Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia—have become bench-
marks in key areas with characteristics of global public goods, including poverty
reduction, health care and education. Southeast Asian countries invest selec-
tively in priority areas such as information technology, biotechnology and worker
training to become fully networked, knowledge-intensive economies (ADB 2001).
Many parts of Southeast Asia are also being carefully watched, because of
their known weaknesses in the areas of financial stability, protection of environ-
mental commons and movement of capital. It must be remembered that the 1997
Asian financial crisis, which infected the entire world, began in Thailand. Its
increasing reliance on exports (at a time when global trade is contracting and
domestic demand continues to be stagnant) makes Southeast Asia highly
vulnerable to a global economic downturn.1
GOVERNANCE AND GROWTH NEXUS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Southeast Asia provides ample evidence that there is a remarkable connection
between administrative guidance and economic upturn. Good governance and
growth go together (Figure 2). When the average growth rate of national output
during the last decade is charted against the quality of country governance, it
becomes apparent that high-performing economies—Singapore and Malaysia—
have the edge in public management. Those lagging economies, such as the
Philippines and Indonesia, meanwhile, have poor management structures. Gov-
ernance quality in this case is a composite measure that has the following
elements: economic management, income distribution, human development,
absence of corruption, bureaucratic efficiency, judicial efficiency, political sta-
bility, and political freedom (Huther and Shah 1998).
1 Outside of Japan, Asian exports—which depends on sales to the US technology industry—account for
as much as 37 percent of the regional GDP.  Malaysia, with 80 percent of its exports to the United States
consisting of IT products, is the hardest hit (Asian Economies: The East is in the Red, The Economist,
May 19, 2001).
Figure 2. Good governance and growth
Sources: Huther and Shah 2000; World Development Report 2002GONZALES AND MENDOZA 139
As stated above, there is a strong relationship between good governance
and good development outcomes. The rigid regulatory structure and restrictive
trade regimes in the Philippines and Indonesia, for example, have hurt their
economic performance. In Singapore and Malaysia, good management—improved
tax effort, high priority given to public spending in health and education—has
been central to substantial poverty reduction. Some poor governance aspects in
Indonesia and the Philippines—principally corruption and high inflation—inflicted
harm that greatly affected the poor.
There is also evidence that Southeast Asian economies found strength
in some dimensions of good management (even if, in general, institutional
weaknesses easily escaped notice amid growth).
For instance, were Southeast Asian governments good at establishing the
rules of the game and playing by those rules? Yes, said investors who gave South-
east Asia fairly high scores for providing credible rules and consistently enforcing
them. In a 1996 World Bank survey of some 3,600 firms worldwide, fewer than 30
percent of entrepreneurs were worried about policy surprises in Southeast Asia.
As Figure 3 implies, predictability in rulemaking builds market confidence that
induces fast growth. Southeast Asian countries were quite ahead of even the
OECD in this regard. The 1997 World Development Report survey of businesses
ranked East Asia Pacific (which includes Southeast Asia) as among the best-
performing regions on measure after measure (World Bank 2000).
Figure 3. Fast growth vis-a-vis perceived predictability in law and policies
The situation is unchanged over a longer period. Southeast Asia remained
convincingly ahead of the other regions (excepting East Asia) in combining both
good governance and high growth between 1990 and 1998. This suggests the
robustness of the outcomes detailed above.
It is true that Southeast Asia’s real institutional strength has been over-
rated. Yet, it is interesting to note that the argument that governance is handmaid
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to economic performance has never been disputed. This time, however, it is the
underlying institutional weaknesses of the region, rather than their depth and
power, that have come under intense scrutiny.  In the final analysis, and for pur-
poses of this paper, what is really important is that across wide differences over
the role played by Asian institutions stretches the recognition that governance
does matter.
GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
The state, within the context of public management and governance, is defined
as a set of institutions that possesses the means of legitimate coercion, exercised
over a defined territory, referred to as a nation or country whose population
comprises what is called society. This suggests that in the context of an
organized government, the state has a monopoly of rulemaking within the
nation or country (WB 1997).
This exclusive possession of coercion, when exercised scrupulously, gives
governments ample ability to do their steering functions effectively. Yet it can also
lead to arbitrary state action or create opportunities for abuse of authority by
public officials. Capricious intervention weakens the very institutions that are set
up to preserve state power.
In the context of public management, veto points help to regulate officials’
exercise of power. Veto points ensure that no policies are adopted and imple-
mented by one party without undergoing scrutiny by a third party. The wider the
separation of powers, the greater the number of veto points to be navigated to
reverse any rule-based commitments. But veto points can also be a drag on the
successful carrying out of policies; they can make it difficult to alter harmful or
outdated rules (WB 1997).
Southeast Asian countries in general have many effective checks and
balances on the actions of political leaders. To begin with, the form of state varies—
from the Philippines’ presidential democracy to the parliamentary systems of
Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia. Thailand and Malaysia are constitutional
monarchies, but the latter also has a federal structure, which gives it a “vertical”
(intergovernmental) veto point. Thailand’s monarchy has been key to ensuring
political continuity in the face of recurrent changes in its civilian government.
In form, Indonesia and the Philippines have powerful chief executives. The
Indonesian presidency has direct legislative powers, although the president is
accountable to the People’s Consultative Assembly, not directly to the electorate.
But a more assertive legislature (after the fall of Suharto) and demands for more
local autonomy (which is intertwined with separatist violence) have constrained
the powers of the chief executive. The Philippine president, directly elected by
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of checks and balances in a setup modeled after that of the United States (US) ties
down the Philippine president. Singapore and Malaysia, on the other hand, have
stronger executives. Backed up by ruling parties, their prime ministers dominate
the legislature.
The above suggests that the character of a country’s political party also
affects the degree to which political power is concentrated or diffused. In
Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, the sheer size of the ruling majority in the
legislature (People’s Action Party or PAP, UMNO and Thai Rak Thai, respec-
tively) and their prime ministers’ dominant and unifying roles in the party mean
domination and little scope for effective opposition, thus weakening a veto
point. In Singapore, the PAP has brought to heel, through tough legislation,
some nongovernmental veto points, such as labor unions and professional group-
ings, which now nominally follow the party line. But at least political parties in
these countries are nominally based on ideologies, unlike those in the Philip-
pines, where members’ constantly shifting allegiances always favor the incum-
bent administration.
Some multiparty coalitions, such as UMNO, own large businesses as a way
of obtaining party funds. Both PAP and Golkar in Indonesia have strong links with
the military, a veto point whose role in any civilian government is often under
question because it reduces accountability (Kaufmann et al. 1999). But it is in
Indonesia where the army has had a formal role in governance, as part of the
consultative assembly. Popular pressure for reform, however, has somewhat liber-
alized the Indonesian political structure, in the process downgrading the army and
strengthening the hands of the legislature, which now constantly challenges the
president and her policies.
Elections, another veto point, vary in frequency. Short electoral cycles, such
as those in the Philippines, give the voters more opportunities of replacing the
legislature (lower house). However, there is a tradeoff: to bolster their reelection
chances, Philippine legislators often favor government programs with visible short-
term results, at the expense of sustainable and better projects. Ironically, frequent
electoral veto has not stopped the country from ousting presidents through extra-
constitutional means. Lower frequency of elections, such as those in Malaysia
and Singapore, offers more political continuity for incumbents.
Indochina and Myanmar are governed quite differently from the Southeast
Asia 5. Vietnam and Laos are socialist states while Myanmar is a military regime.
All three have centralized planning structures although Laos is probably the least
bureaucratized. Cambodia has opened up a bit, but is still saddled with its socialist
past. Naturally, veto points come few and far between.
In Vietnam, government and the ruling Communist Party overlap exten-
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agers often double as party secretaries in state enterprises, which helps explain
resistance to reform.
Electoral participation
In a recent study of governance in some 85 countries, Kaufmann et al. (1999),
drawing from a large data set of investor surveys, came up with an aggregate index
on “voice and accountability,” which partly gauges the extent of the electorate’s
participation in selecting and replacing public officials. Among the concepts mea-
sured by this indicator are change in government, orderly transfer, free and fair
elections, free vote, representative legislature and political parties.
The results for Southeast Asia are illustrated in Figure 4. If the resulting
picture is indicative of how freely the citizens of Southeast Asian countries can
choose their political leaders, then only the Philippines and Thailand seem to
provide a good environment for free and accountable elections. Malaysia and
Singapore, perhaps because of their autocratic setups, have lower ratings, as does
Indonesia, which scores badly. The transition economies of Southeast Asia—
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia—are, of course, still under a command-and-control
governance framework, appear to deprive their citizens of truly representative
voting. Myanmar seems an electoral basket case.
Figure 4. Voice index in Southeast Asia
Veto points over a longer period
Instead of just a snapshot in time, a picture of Southeast Asian governance
structures within a longer time frame should yield richer insights. Figure 5
represents averages of the years 1945 through 1998. The data were compiled by
Djankov et al. (2001). The indicators include (a) executive de facto independence;
(b) constraints on executive power; and (c) effectiveness of the legislature.
Source: Kaufmann et al. 1999
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Figure 5. Southeast Asia’s governance structure
The first index measures the degree of independence of the country’s chief
executive, that is, whether he or she experiences substantial autonomy or severe
limitations. The index of constraints on executive power measures the number of
veto points in the country. The veto points include (a) an effective legislature (a
bicameral system gets more points); (b) an independent judiciary; and (c) a strong
federal system. Effectiveness of the legislature, the last index, determines how
capable and responsive the legislature is.
Figure 5 shows how strongly correlated the three indicators are, suggesting
that the strength of the executive is always matched by the number of veto points
and the efficacy of the legislature. Note that over a broader period, Malaysia’s
executive turns out to be the most powerful. But the veto points are also quite
numerous. Its 13 states—each with its own constitution, a council of state, a
cabinet and executive authority and a legislature dealing with matters not reserved
for the federal parliament—represent a formidable set of constraints on the federal
system itself. The Philippines’ presidency comes in second, but again, the veto
points, especially a bicameral Congress and a largely independent judiciary,
restrain its actions. Vietnam is seen as weaker in both executive power and institu-
tions intended to dilute it. But weaknesses sometimes translate into an advantage:
Vietnam is less handicapped by checks and balances, which one finds in open
political systems. Its command-based planning system, as the World Bank (2000)
suggests, can advance (and control the pace of) all-embracing reforms, once
decisions are taken.
Finally, it is useful to see how states maintain a delicate balance between
rights and institutions. Figure 6 suggests that autocracy and political rights move
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in opposite directions. Malaysia again leads the pack, not necessarily because it is
less autocratic than the rest, or because its elections are freer, but because in the
period under study (1972-1998), circumstances in the two most democratic nations
in the region, Philippines (martial rule in the 1970s) and Thailand (recurrent coups),
did not augur well for both political rights and open political institutions. The
current liberalizing trend in Indonesia likewise is not enough to offset the long
years of autocracy under Suharto. As expected, Vietnam does not fare well be-
cause of its closed political system.
Figure 6. Autocracy and political freedom in Southeast Asia
THREE DIMENSIONS OF GOVERNANCE
The section examines Southeast Asia’s three dimensions of governance fol-
lowing the distinctions proposed by UNDP (1998): administrative governance
is the system of policy implementation; economic governance includes
decisionmaking processes that affect a country’s economic activities and its
relationships with other economies. It clearly has major implications for equity,
poverty and quality of life; and political governance is the process of
decisionmaking to formulate policy.
Administrative governance
The right size for Asian governments
Is a lean state the courier of both growth and welfare? While as a whole Southeast
Asian governments are small, Figures 7 and 8 show a much more varied pattern
within the region, and imply that a bit of an expansion takes place before govern-
ments settle to a slimmer size, as both incomes and human development improve.
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The order of appearance of the countries is not exactly identical, but the following
picture should hold:
Figure 7. Government expenditure vis-à-vis income
Figure 8. HDI leaders in Asia
Hong Kong SAR and Singapore were clearly the benchmarks in size and
scope of government, having generated the highest growth rates in per capita
incomes2 and human development. For Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines,
government spending was good enough to reach high human development but
2 Whenever available, purchasing power parity (PPP) values are used for ratios to facilitate cross-country
comparisons. The use of comparable international prices noticeably increases the ratio for developing
countries.
Sources: Asian Development Outlook 2002; Human Development Report 2001
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would need a boost to catch up with the leaders on the income side. Indonesia,
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were still struggling to balance size with growth and
human welfare, and their governments would probably have to expand a little to
provide more public goods.
Still, as the World Bank suggests, big governments tend to be quite ineffi-
cient—they imply costly government programs—and consequently may add little
to growth. But in the same breadth, when growth is stalled, social pressures for
spending rise. Again, inordinate government consumption spending, unless the
aim is to build social safety nets during difficult periods, is basically a net tax with
questionable benefits to society. But cutting consumption aimlessly may also cut
deeply into items that make people’s lives better, say, teachers’ salaries or medi-
cines. Rightsizing is not made easier when a vicious cycle sets in.
Performance management: the civil service
With relatively small governments, the fiscal pressure exerted by the wage bill is
considerably low. Between 1996 and 2000, the average annual central government
wage bill within East Asia and the Pacific is only 9.4 percent of the GDP, and, as
Figure 9 shows, it is even less in Southeast Asian economies. The range is from an
abnormally low 1.9 percent in Myanmar to about 7.7 percent in Malaysia, way
below the total central government expenditure for Southeast Asia, shown as the
rightmost bar in Figure 9.
Figure 9. Wage bill of central governments in Southeast Asia
Source: World Bank Public Sector and Employment SurveyGONZALES AND MENDOZA 147
This means that downsizing of governments in Southeast Asia is not needed.
Globally, the tendency is to match high wages with a lean workforce (WB 1997).
That is, government employment is negatively associated with wages. A highly
paid, high-quality civil service, which is small in number, means substituting qual-
ity for quantity. But Southeast Asia has defied this trend.
When the government wage to per capita GDP ratio is plotted against gov-
ernment employment, as in Figure 10, Malaysia and Thailand are seen as having a
huge number of high-salaried public employees. The Indochinese trio of Vietnam,
Laos and Cambodia (and Myanmar), on the other hand, has slim civil service
structures, but the workers are lowly paid too.3 Only the Philippines combines
high average pay with a trim civil service. Overall, the situation calls for intelligent
ways to reduce the number of public employees. A cautionary note is that the right
size of the workforce depends on the roles assigned to government; while wage
adequacy depends on private compensation levels (Schiavo-Campo et al. 1997).
Figure 10. Public employment vis-à-vis wages in Southeast Asia
But does high salary go with high accountability? Or is poor accountability,
expressed as corruption, more closely associated with low wages? Anecdotal
proof suggests that poor pay compels civil servants in developing countries to
accept bribes to augment their incomes. Most crosscountry studies find only a
weak link. So do anecdotal researches.
3 For instance, in Cambodia, real wages in the public sector (US$20/month on average) have fallen
sharply in recent years, as they are outside the capacity of national budget resources to pay (World Bank
2000a).
Source: World Bank Public Sector Wages and Employment SurveyPHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2004 148
Alternative service delivery modes
As Southeast Asian governments rightsize, many of the services that they
provide will inevitably have to be taken over by other entities. Most countries in
the  region have pushed for some form of  privatization in key areas of the economy.
Even the infrastructure sector, which has proven to be impervious to change, has
yielded to privatization.
One consequence of private participation has been to lower the cost of
infrastructure services, with spillover effects on other services, such as those in
the energy sector. Figure 11 shows what happens when costs are lowered: more
foreign investments come in (as they did in Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and
Vietnam), inducing a virtuous circle where more firms participate in various
sectors, principally in infrastructure.
Figure 11. Energy cost and foreign investment in Southeast Asia
Economic governance
Access to services
Government policies that combine public spending and private participation
in cost-effective ways in infrastructure services have not only increased
tremendously the flow of investments in this sector; it has also ensured
greater coverage of poor people within the Southeast Asian region. The
overall quality and coverage of infrastructure services such as electricity,
water, telecommunications and transport have a major impact on living
standards (WB 2002).
Source: Human Development Report 2001GONZALES AND MENDOZA 149
Data on what causes the differences in access and level of infrastructure
services in Southeast Asia are hard to come by, but a few anecdotal facts might be
useful. Lack of clear-cut rules on how to mobilize private investment is apparent in
Vietnam (World Bank 2000b) and Laos (World Bank 1999). Institutions in Laos are
relatively weak, given its low level of development. On the other hand, Cambodia
suffers much from inadequate capacity to plan, manage and implement water
services. In fact, there is no institutional structure that can do it, resulting in
unreliable service and poor quality of water (ADB 2000). It also has no framework
for public-private participation in electricity supply (World Bank 2000a).
Even if rules exist in Indonesia, the private sector remains hesitant to
participate, while the public sector is inefficient in maintaining water supply and
sanitation, roads and urban services (ADB 2001b). In the Philippines, nonurban
electricity is provided by rural electric cooperatives, most of which render
unsatisfactory services. Partly as a result, electrification in rural areas is less than
65 percent. Philippine tariffs are also among the highest in the region and have
discouraged foreign investment (World Bank 1999a).
Cost of doing business
Excessive regulations undermine trade and business development. Wage and price
controls, anticompetition policies, barriers to entry in major economic sectors and
weak antitrust policies combine in diverse ways to discourage the flow of invest-
ments, thus hindering growth.
When all these factors are measured, the result is a composite index of
regulatory burden (Kaufmann et al. 1999). For Southeast Asian nations, the regu-
latory picture is varied. Singapore stands out as the economy with the friendliest
regulatory structure. The Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand to lesser degrees
have likewise relaxed many of their stringent market-unfriendly policies. As ex-
pected, the command economies in the region, chiefly Laos and Vietnam, are still
weighed down by a host of regulations.
The number of procedures required to register a business is also higher in
Southeast Asia compared to industrial countries. In Canada and Australia, for
instance, it takes only two steps to complete the registration.
The number of procedures correlates with income per capita, as Figure 12
shows. Lower income economies such as Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia
have more procedures. The number of procedures is also associated with time and
cost variables, implying that entrepreneurs pay a steep price in terms of fees and
delays in countries that make intense use of ex-ante screening. As an example, in
Vietnam, completing 16 procedures demands 112 business days and 1.78 percent
of GDP per capita (Claessens et al. 1999).PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2004 150
Figure 12. Registration procedures and income in Southeast Asia
Claessens et al. (1999) argue that while stricter regulation of entry is associ-
ated with higher quality of products, better pollution records, or keener competi-
tion (as suggested by data in a cross-section of countries), stricter regulation of
entry also brings about sharply higher levels of corruption and a greater unofficial
economy.
Figure 13 shows that the high costs of regulation also give rise to a larger
unofficial economy. This is true in Indonesia, and to a lesser extent, the Philippines
and Malaysia. Costly regulations deter entry into the formal sector and reduce
competition.
Figure 13. Effect of cost of entry on unofficial economy
Source: Djankov et al. 2001
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Political governance
Rule of law and judicial independence
Even as the high-performing Southeast Asian economies registered record-break-
ing growth rates, signs of weak points within the region had emerged: judicial
independence was grossly compromised and corruption rose to unprecedented
levels. Corruption and a weak judicial system are likely partners in crime, so to speak,
feeding on each other to erode a country’s institutional defenses (Mauro 1997).
The 1998 World Competitiveness Report suggests that as a whole Asia is
not rated highly on both counts, although it is the ASEAN trio of Indonesia,
Malaysia, and the Philippines, plus China, which has pulled down the overall
ranking of Asia. Indonesia and the Philippines are among the bottom dwellers
worldwide, indicating that, in these countries, economic rent-seekers are perceived
as often having a heyday undermining the institutions designed to keep them out.
High levels of public corruption undermine the legitimacy of the state itself
and weaken its capacity to provide institutions that support growth and develop-
ment. Corruption reflects a distorted policy environment, where public officials are
likely to manipulate rules to pursue their self-interest. It weakens the judiciary so
much that it is unable to provide a credible threat of punishment when official
misconduct is discovered (WB 1997).
Conflict management
Ethnic tensions have been rising in Southeast Asia in the last decade. This trend
implies poor conflict management on the part of these countries and argues for
better public institutions to bridge the gap between groups.
Economic growth in countries whose current levels of ethnic tension are
highest (Indonesia and the Philippines) is in a precarious state. Figure 14 indicates
that a high degree of ethnic hostilities can affect the rate of growth. The concern is
that these economies will go into a steeper tailspin if international investors equate
ethnic conflict with political instability and pull out from the region.
When conflict is prolonged, access to social services and economic oppor-
tunities is severely curtailed. In Cambodia, for instance, some parts of the country
are still inaccessible even as the security situation has eased. Government is
unable to provide health and education services, or basic physical infrastructure.




Corruption can reduce the gains from decentralization. But decentralization can
reduce the risks and benefits of corruption. In a decentralized system, citizens canPHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2004 152
Figure 14.  Ethnic tension and growth
curb the incentives for corruption by learning about government activities and
filing complaints (voice). They can also counter bribery demands by moving out
of the system or “voting with their feet” (exit) (UNDP 1997).
Decentralization here means shifting a substantial block of political, fiscal
and administrative powers held by central governments to subnational public
authorities. It assumes that subnational governments, once autonomous, are ca-
pable of taking binding decisions in at least some policy areas. In more practical
terms, decentralization expands the resources and responsibilities of existing
subnational government units (WB 1999 and 2000).
Fisman and Gatti (2000) find that fiscal decentralization is consistently asso-
ciated with minimal corruption. Countries with more decentralized expenditure
have better corruption ratings, specifically, the size of the coefficient implies that
one standard deviation increase in decentralization is associated with an improve-
ment in the country’s corruption rating equal to 40 percent of one standard devia-
tion of the corruption index.
Figure 15 validates this result. When the extent of decentralization is matched
with Transparency International’s corruption perception index, what becomes
apparent is the negative association between them, at least in certain parts of
Southeast Asia. Indonesia, which has the worst corruption rating in the region, is
also the least localized. At the other end of the spectrum is Malaysia, which
combines a higher level of decentralization with a lower level of corruption. In the
Philippines, corruption is less pronounced in lower levels (Azfar et al. 2000) and
the expenditure system is fairly decentralized. Notice that in highly devolved sys-
tems such as Switzerland, the perception of corruption is at its lowest level. The
same is true with the United States and Argentina, to a lesser extent.
Sources: University of Maryland IRIS Center 2000; World Development Report 2002GONZALES AND MENDOZA 153
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Improving governance in Southeast Asia requires a reform agenda that is directed
at broad-based development and designed based on the peculiarities of Southeast
Asian economies. While considering good international practices, governance
reforms in Southeast Asia must build on the unique historical and cultural make-
up of the region and must be mindful of the level of political and economic devel-
opment of each country.
The key to successful interventions on governance effectiveness in South-
east Asia also lies in the phased introduction of reform packages. Reforms in the
public sector must target the core institutions: public finance, civil service, legal
institutions and the judiciary.
Sponsors and implementors must likewise bear in mind that they cannot
introduce more hard-hitting reforms in Southeast Asia than have been prescribed
by international financing institutions like the International Monetary Fund and
World Bank, leaving the region under tremendous pressure to effect political
stability and revive their sluggish economies. They must also take precautionary
measures to protect the poorest and marginalized segments of the region’s
population from bearing the brunt of radical reforms.
The nature and extent of necessary reforms in governance will differ
across Southeast Asia. The Southeast Asia 5—Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia,
Thailand and the Philippines—is farther along the route to liberalization and
tripartism (i.e., participation of three key actors: the government, the private sector
Sources: Transparency International, IMF Gov't Finance Statistics
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and civil society in governance). They are generally more endowed with
managerial capacity, have more developed democratic systems and governance
structures, and thus would mainly need assistance in institutional strengthening.
Younger democracies and transition states like Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia
and Myanmar are trailing in the path toward open and competitive economies.
They still have much to learn in terms of private sector and civil society participa-
tion in governance. Thus, they will benefit from assistance in developing new
institutions, transfer of public management and participation technology.
Public sector reform will only take place when a country’s leaders are
committed and occupy the driver’s seat. No amount of help will strengthen
governance and institutions in Southeast Asia without political will.
Southeast Asia’s hope of recovering and accelerating growth momentum
depends on measures to be instituted to increase transparency and account-
ability, make regulations and incentives more responsive, enhance the efficiency
and effectiveness of enabling and transmission mechanisms and build constitu-
encies for reforms.
Regardless of their individual levels of development, Southeast Asian
countries need to establish and strengthen their transparency and account-
ability structures.
Transparency and accountability
Southeast Asian central governments need to define the boundaries of their
functions to determine their accountabilities. The key assignment roles of central
governments are to ensure provision of public goods and handle macroeconomic
management. That suggests that each central government should limit itself to
steering while letting the other key players in society, such as the private sector
and civil society, do the rowing. Operationally, this means rightsizing govern-
ments, which in part is accomplished by pushing privatization. Accelerated
privatization in Indonesia and reforms in state-owned enterprises in Vietnam are
examples of recent donor-supported moves along these lines.
By shedding provisioning functions and allowing markets to work, South-
east Asian governments can raise public sector efficiency and reduce the strain on
public finances, thus promoting greater accountability. Rightsizing of Southeast
Asian governments is in order but must be done cautiously. For some, like
Thailand and the Philippines, a bit of expansion may have to take place before
Southeast Asian governments settle to a slimmer size and achieve a balance
between size of government, growth and human welfare.
While pushing for greater private sector participation, reforms in provi-
sioning public goods must consider the capability of the market to provide these
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intervention should not be worse than what the market is inefficiently or inef-
fectively providing. For example, the record of Southeast Asian governments
is better in enlarging access to electricity through greater participation of the
private sector. The presence of multiple providers adds to high institutional
quality in highly populated areas. In remote areas with many poor people,
where private entry is not forthcoming, the provision of these services must
rest with the state.
If privatization makes central governments do their job better, so does
transfer of functions to subnational governments, which is another shedding
mode. The aim is to decongest the central government of direct service provision.
The World Bank, for instance, recommends reforming the management of educa-
tion in Vietnam by appropriate decentralization. In many Southeast Asian coun-
tries, a corollary objective of decentralization is to remove concurrency, which
raises hard questions on which level of government has true accountability.
Specifically, services assigned as joint responsibility of central and subnational
governments like industry and agriculture, education, health, social welfare,
police, environmental management and even public works need to be clear-cut.
Exceptions are cases where subnational government capacity is weak (e.g.,
construction of massive infrastructure like farm-to-market roads, bridges, tele-
communication facilities and the like). In these instances, the central government
cannot immediately relinquish its responsibility; concurrency is necessary while
the central government is devolving. Handholding ensures that subnational units
are able to absorb the functions corresponding to their capacity levels. Decen-
tralization in Southeast Asia must proceed with economies of scale in mind and
caution to forestall reversals or recentralization, as in the case of Laos.
Once central government responsibility is defined, it should have the
resources required to discharge its streamlined functions. The state has to gen-
erate revenue to fulfill its responsibility. As the findings indicate, most Southeast
Asian governments are saddled with unbalanced budgets—revenues are not
sufficient to support vital expenditure, especially spending for basic social
services. Even domestic and international borrowings are not enough to close the
financing gap. Hence, tax reform is an indispensable component of the gover-
nance improvement package in Southeast Asia. The urgent need is for more
efficient and more accountable tax management. At the very least, eliminating
individual discretion and defining taxing authority more clearly in tax agencies
would be a step in the right direction. Tax reform also means shifting from interna-
tional to domestic taxation, a move that would place a heavy burden on domestic
tax collection agencies. To prepare for such eventuality, these agencies must be
able to expand their domestic tax bases, a shift that would require increased an-
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As Southeast Asian governments fulfill their obligations, they must avoid
wastages in procurement and tendering processes, the sources of leakages on the
expenditure side. The more advanced countries in the region have made progress
in public expenditure management. The Philippines, for instance, has adopted
electronic bidding, allowed civil society groups to organize procurement watch-
dogs, revised rules to make the procurement transactions more transparent and
forged integrity pacts with private firms. Southeast Asian countries where corrup-
tion in public procurement is perceived to be rampant (e.g., Indonesia and
Thailand) can benefit from these experiences.
As the private sector increasingly becomes involved in the provision of
goods and services erstwhile supplied by government, it must improve its own
public accountability structure. Establishing and strengthening the accountabil-
ity of the private sector means enhancing its readiness to absorb risk. Private
sector risk-taking, in which obligations are self-guaranteed by the sector, would
keep the government from providing bailout options in cases of default, thus
reducing moral hazard.
Another critical area for reform is corporate governance. A key step is to
increase disclosure and protect the public interest in publicly listed corporations
(in the case of Southeast Asian countries with working stock exchanges) and
state-owned enterprises (especially in the transition economies of Vietnam, Laos
and Cambodia). In Vietnam, for example, what is urgent is to accelerate the reform
of state-owned enterprises, especially debt-strapped parastatals that drain public
funds. Public accountability of firms participating in the provision of public goods
must be strengthened through transparent rules and independent auditing and
accounting procedures.
Fair governance requires increasing access to basic services by the
deprived and disadvantaged segments of the populations of Southeast Asian
countries. Problems of access to basic services are more severe in the transition
states (e.g., Laos, Cambodia) and those with high levels of ethnic conflict (e.g.,
Indonesia). Yet, paradoxically, the solution is to widen the access to these
services. The governance perspective permits shifting of focus to the poor and
disadvantaged sectors of Southeast Asian societies, since part of overall
accountability is to promote social equity as a corollary to economic growth. To
enlarge coverage, the less developed Southeast Asian countries burdened by
revenue shortfalls must allow flexibility in quality and price of provisions,
especially in water supply and sanitation. They should likewise encourage liberal
entry of informal providers at levels where high standards are not required, as long
as users and informal providers agree on set standards that do not compromise
quality and safety. Public spending on social services must be high on the agenda
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Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar need to put more of their resources in social
services. Vietnam needs reforms to widen access to basic social services, espe-
cially among the disadvantaged groups. Provision of education is urgent to meet
the high-level manpower needed for the transformation of its economy. To be able
to increase public resources going to preventive health care, Vietnam must en-
courage private provision of curative health care.
Subnational governments in Southeast Asia need to strengthen their
autonomy to bolster overall government accountability in achieving broad-
based growth. Making subnational governments more independent and account-
able requires fiscal decentralization—that is, the ability to finance their expendi-
tures with revenues within their control. A clearer definition of accountabilities is
needed, such as determining tax and expenditure assignments across levels of
government. Allocation and spending rules, for one, must be clearly set, such as
those for social expenditure and the 20/20 initiative. Such accountability
measures are important as central government functions are devolved to prevent
decentralizing even the failings of governance, such as corruption. Efforts to
increase autonomy of subnational governments must not be devoid of reforms in
intergovernmental fiscal relations to close the vertical imbalance, which is persis-
tent in Indonesia and the Philippines.
Eliminating vertical imbalance in many Southeast Asian countries calls for a
transfer of more taxing powers to subnational governments. That way, decen-
tralization can proceed with equity in terms of allocation of resources and re-
sponsibilities. Subnational governments will be motivated to take on tax assign-
ments and increase tax collection efficiency if they are allowed to keep the taxes
they collect.
As government functions are decentralized, the complexity by which
these functions are discharged must be removed. Without losing controls,
rules corresponding to these functions should be made simpler. The level of
sophistication of rules to be enforced by subnational governments should
match the level of sophistication of their capacity. Even when expenditure
functions are substantially decentralized, certain instruments such as match-
ing grants must be introduced to allow the central government to muster local
resources in line with national priorities and to influence the spending pat-
terns of subnational governments.
Flexibility also means that rules can be adapted to respond to unique situa-
tions. For example, in cases where there is civil unrest and or ethnic tension, rules
must give subnational governments more leeway in governing ethnic regions.
Civil society organizations (CSOs) working in partnership with the gov-
ernment must be made accountable for their actions. Right now, it is hard to make
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found in government or in the private sector. Unlike government agencies or
private firms, CSOs may not have long shelf lives. They can easily abandon their
public responsibility. Thus, they must draft their own partnering rules, entry and
exit regulations, rules on information provision and disclosure, and sanctions
for misbehavior. In the Philippines, a large CSO coalition, the Caucus of Devel-
opment NGO networks (CODE-NGO) has adopted an accountability framework
by crafting its own code of ethics.
CSOs articulating certain issues are increasing in number. With the rise of
civic movement and proliferation of NGOs, CSOs and people’s organizations in
Southeast Asia, some kind of accreditation may be called for to separate groups
who cannot be held accountable for their action or nonaction and thus betray
public trust.
The independence of the judiciary—the ultimate guarantor of account-
ability—must be secured. The judiciary in any country is the last bastion of
good governance. When all else fails, the judiciary is the only recourse for
arbitration and mediation. Prior to the Asian crisis, there was a positive per-
ception of the rule of law in the region. Yet even as the high performing
Southeast Asian economies registered record-breaking growth rates, signs
of weak points in the judicial system emerged. Today, judicial independence
is grossly compromised while judicial inefficiencies continue to hurt the flow
of investments. The ownership concentration in Southeast Asian firms is
also a telling sign of the low level of institutional development of the legal
system. A turnaround in Southeast Asia would require further development
of the legal systems and reforms to enhance judicial independence and raise
judicial efficiency.
The transparency of the judicial processes also needs to be increased.
This can be done by providing civil society and media with timely judicial infor-
mation. Likewise, setting up reliable and up-to-date judicial data bases will make
cases easy to track and hard to manipulate.
The concept of a court watch—civil society as monitors of judges’ perfor-
mance—can be adopted by Southeast Asian CSOs to increase pressure for
change in the behavior of erring judges.
An anticorruption action plan will provide relief where corruption is
pervasive. High levels of corruption undermine the legitimacy of a number of
Southeast Asian countries and weaken their capacities to provide institutions
that support growth and development. To remove this obstacle to growth, South-
east Asian countries must seriously implement counter-corruption measures. A
national anticorruption plan, owned and sponsored by central government offi-
cials, can help prevent wastage of government resources and “state capture.” It
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A more thorough and country-specific analysis of the factors that engender
corruption is essential in designing responsive national anticorruption plans. Such
plans must have both punitive and preventive measures and must engage the
general public in the campaign. Southeast Asian countries need not reinvent
solutions since a menu of anticorruption instruments is readily available. The
World Bank has been instrumental in the Philippine government’s efforts to
develop a National Anticorruption Plan in 2000. The World Bank is also assist-
ing Indonesia and Thailand in this regard.
Regulations and incentives
A turnaround in Southeast Asia would require more responsive regulatory insti-
tutions and further development of incentives.
Concrete actions include deregulating, generating positive incentives,
and simplifying transactions and entry procedures. There is overwhelming evi-
dence that excessive regulation and weak incentives thwart economic growth in
Southeast Asia. The regulatory burden stalls trade and business development,
especially in command economies in the region (e.g., Laos and Vietnam). While
regulation for business entry is less restrictive in some Southeast Asian coun-
tries like Thailand and Singapore, overregulation (e.g., higher cost of registra-
tion and complex procedures for registering a business) in the rest of the region
discourages business entry.
Revitalizing economic activities is of paramount importance in reducing
poverty in Southeast Asia. Making the cost of doing business in Southeast
Asia more competitive requires removal of barriers on firm entry and less re-
strictive entry procedures. Actions of Southeast Asian governments must
proceed along deregulation, development of incentives and simplification of
government requirements and procedures. Cambodia, for instance (according
to the ADB), has considerable potential for further private sector growth in
manufacturing and services, as demonstrated by the proliferation of micro
enterprises, small and medium enterprises and multinational companies. The
manufacturing and services sector will prosper with less restrictions and bet-
ter incentives.
The priority of policymakers in Southeast Asian economies, weighed down
by overregulation, must focus on facilitating the entry of more players in the
market and alternative providers of public goods and services. Standardization
of laws and regulations to reduce enforcement cost of transactions across bor-
ders (e.g., rules on entry of products) will stimulate free flow of goods and
services in the region thus invigorating Southeast Asian economies. When not
standardized, the goods or services will seek their own levels and turn to areas
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Rewriting exit rules may also be necessary to prevent “hit-and-run” invest-
ments. Southeast Asia must tighten such rules so that private providers of public
goods will not readily pull out investments in long-term projects with lower
returns, or exit in cases of default. An appropriate measure toward this end is
setting investment targets and making private providers commit to providing
electricity or water supply coverage within a certain period.
Regulatory reform in Southeast Asia must also look into rule simplification
(e.g., international and domestic taxation rules to facilitate collection of taxes).
When state enforcement capacity is weak, simpler and less discretionary regula-
tions are less likely to be undermined by corruption. The Philippine government,
for instance, is trying to simplify taxation by reformulating the corporate tax code.
Under this scheme, firms will pay a 20 to 26 percent tax on gross income instead of
the current 32 percent tax on net income. The ADB supports improvements in tax
administration, elimination of leaks and loopholes, and stricter enforcement of
existing tax laws.
High dividends, especially for the underserved segments of the population,
are also expected if Southeast Asian governments can adopt more flexible rules in
the provision of basic services. Unbundling the setting up of infrastructure for
basic services, permitting entry of informal providers and allowing “mix-and-match”
arrangement, such as local communities providing labor in exchange for lower
connection fees, will widen access to needed services. Such demand-responsive
approaches, however, need to be linked to an effective regulatory framework for
private-public collaboration.
Southeast Asian governments, however, must pursue deregulation balanced
by consumer protection and in consonance with international rules. It is acknowl-
edged that while international rules assume a level playing field, Southeast Asian
countries are at a disadvantage in terms of developed institutions. Deregulation
must thus proceed with caution in areas where Southeast Asian states have weak
institutional defenses.
Regulations are likewise needed to break interlocking patterns of busi-
ness-government relations and/or business-political party relations—a practice
that constitutes grand corruption and spawns state capture in some South-
east Asian countries. Examples of reforms in this sector are ADB-funded
programs that cover improvement of corporate governance, reinforcement of
regulatory and supervisory arrangements, and expansion of investor base.
Such reforms also call for upgrading of standards of corporate disclosure
and transparency.
In all of Southeast Asia, the effectiveness of the judiciary is important to
ensure fair governance. What is urgent and easily doable is to reform litigation
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help reduce the caseload of the judiciary, since less regulation means fewer
burdens on the courts. A performance-based merit system and competitive pay
for judges will likewise go a long way in improving the integrity of the judiciary.
Enabling and transmission mechanisms
Transmission mechanisms can work effectively through good enforcement, inno-
vation in delivery and by encouraging decentralization.
Curbing arbitrariness in government actions requires strong enforcement
mechanisms. Good governance means predictability. Governments have been
known to impede the development of markets through arbitrary exercise of power.
Institutions that limit the state’s capacity for arbitrary action will improve its ability
to provide institutions that support broad-based markets.
As Southeast Asian countries, especially the transition economies, move
toward greater liberalization and people participation, new institutions are needed.
While new institutions are being developed, Southeast Asian countries would
also need interventions to enhance existing mechanisms such as civil service and
administrative systems. Reforms in civil service can include meritocracy, the de-
velopment of management cadre and the inculcation of quality orientation for
frontline service personnel. The public sector in some Southeast Asian countries,
especially those with long “command-and-control” history may need to be im-
bued with client orientation to make them more responsive to their constituents.
The Southeast Asia 5 in general has many effective checks and balances on
the actions of political leaders (e.g., separation of powers and the presence of veto
points). In Southeast Asian economies under a command-and-control governance
framework, however, the extent of the electorate’s participation in elections is
perceived to be less truly representative of the citizens’ voice. Voice mechanisms
that could be strengthened include representation in subnational bodies, using
civil society as pressure point, allowing users to determine/influence the delivery
structure of government services. Mechanisms must also equip various sectors,
especially ethnic groups, with veto powers.
Southeast Asian governments can adopt alternative delivery mechanisms
to widen people’s access to basic services. In areas where they do better than
government, private sector can participate in the provision of public goods. Civil
society organizations can also serve as government substitute in providing
services (e.g., community managing infrastructure and maintenance). Governments
may also include mechanisms that enable informal providers to serve areas not
covered by major providers.
Delivery mechanisms can also be enhanced by devolving the provision of
basic services like basic education and health to subnational governments. Gradual
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mechanisms that could worsen the situation. Simply decentralizing the provision
of basic services to lower levels of government may exacerbate existing inequities
or shift failings to levels even less capable of resolving them.
Subnational governments need additional instruments such as a mechanism
for subnational borrowings to discharge the functions devolved to them.
Subnational borrowings to augment local expenditure remain a major issue in
many Southeast Asian countries. Most of these countries are still developing
subnational borrowing instruments and regulations. They would benefit from as-
sistance in developing local debt service arrangements. Assistance to improve
revenue generation at the local level can yield high decentralization dividends.
The rise of ethnic tensions in Southeast Asia implies poor conflict manage-
ment and argues for more efficient public institutions to bridge the gap between
differing groups. Reforms are urgently needed in regions where ethnic tension is
at its peak (e.g., Indonesia and the Philippines). To complement peacebuilding
efforts, reforms are imperative in areas where ethnic groups are generally disad-
vantaged due to poor living conditions, poor infrastructure, lack of nonfarm work,
inferior access to education, lack of access to water, sanitation and electricity.
Negotiations and peace talks are critical but access to basic services and re-
sources will accelerate the peace process and make peace enduring.
Final word: on constituency building
In gearing up for more transparent, accountable and fair governance in Southeast
Asia, the challenge lies in seeking allies and building constituencies for reform.
The first step in building constituencies is to identify those who have the
incentives and influence to undertake the reforms. Constituency building, in
conjunction with public pressure and private sector participation, is essential to
tip the scale in favor of regulatory reform, institutional changes and  the develop-
ment of more effective transmission mechanisms. The constituencies of gover-
nance reforms in Southeast Asia comprise the following players:
) Government career executives and frontline service personnel: They
have the incentive and influence to support the reform in civil service.
Career executives are instrumental in improving the quality of public
management. Frontline service personnel can guarantee quality,
consistency and the timely discharge of government service at the
point of delivery.
) Private sector: This sector stands to benefit as government sheds its
functions. Private entities offer alternative mechanisms in the delivery
of public goods. But they ought to be able to take risks as they absorb
government functions.
) Subnational governments: They are the stalwarts of fiscal decentrali-GONZALES AND MENDOZA 163
zation. They have high stakes in providing basic services according to
local needs and preferences.
) Central government: Governance reforms would have to start from
national governments. Central governments have the overall respon-
sibility of ensuring adequate provision of critical public goods and
maintaining social order. The initiative to devolve functions and
support decentralization must come from them. Regulatory reform and
development of positive incentives rest on central government.
) Local communities: They are the source of demand-led activity. They
can help ensure quality of public goods by complementing govern-
ment in managing local infrastructure projects and maintaining
common facilities at the local level.
) Civil society: This serves as strong pressure point for reforms. Civil
society organizations can be the watchdog of government decisions
and actions. They enhance accountability by keeping government and
the private sector on their toes.
One way to build constituencies is by supporting the interest of the
majority. Another is by connecting the community of reform actors through
free flow of information.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2004 164
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